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Introduction 
We make aesthetic judgments about nature just as often as we 
make aesthetic judgments about art. But whilst art is the product of 
human artifice, nature is not. And whilst the institution of art is the 
product of seemingly ever-changing social practices, nature exists irre-
spective of human interest. Given the disanalogies between art and 
nature, are the normative standards of correctness that govern our aes-
thetic judgments of art applicable in the case of nature? 
Two influential accounts are offered by Malcolm Budd and Allen 
Carlson. Budd argues that the aesthetic appreciation of nature is 
characterised distinctively by a freedom and relativity absent from the 
aesthetic appreciation of art. Carlson, however, maintains that nor-
mativity in the aesthetic appreciation bf nature is grounded just as 
strongly as in the artistic case. My view is that the two theories respec-
tively make too much and too little of the disanalogies that exist be-
tween nature and art, and I argue for a middle ground. 
I - Malcolm Budd: Freedom and Relativity 
Budd maintains that there are standards of correctness in the ap-
preciation of art which involve an artwork being seen in its appropriate 
art-historical category. This category is determined by the intentions of 
the artist. Such categories (such as cubism, Gothic architecture, impres-
sionism) will serve to expose the true aesthetic properties of the 
artwork (when seen under optimal conditions by a suitable observer). 
By contrast, the appreciation of natural items, ungoverned by the stric-
tures of style and intentional design, is endowed with a 'freedom denied 
to the appreciation of art' (Budd 2002: 147), which is an 'integral' feature 
and constitutes to nature's 'distinctive' appeal (148). 
Budd's primary claim is that the aesthetic appreciation of nature is 
the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature: "it must be integral to the 
rewarding (or displeasing) character of the experience offered by na-
ture that its object is experienced as natural." (2) This distinguishes 
Budd's approach from other authors, such as Stephen Davies, who 
model the appreciation of nature on the appreciation of art (Davies 
1991: 49). But nature is not art and treating nature as art is insufficient 
as a general model of the ways we do aesthetically appreciate nature. 
Art-model approaches are unattractive candidates, for delimiting nature 
as a domain of aesthetic interest would be unmotivated if its natural-
ness did not feature in the account of how to appreciate it. 
However, Budd proposes no further constraints on the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature than that it be appreciated as nature. Even the 
kind of natural thing an object is need not be relevant: "it may well be 
aesthetically more rewarding ... to contemplate it in abstraction ... and 
focus on its shape, textures and colours" (2). As such, his position is a 
limited cognitivism: our aesthetic judgments are informed by knowl-
edge, but only the knowledge that the item is natural. Reading Budd in 
this way is supported by his account of appreciating nature as nature. 
It is not just a negative condition which rules out as irrelevant those 
aesthetic qualities that would accrue to a natural item if it were a work 
of art. Rather, it is meant in a positive sense: one bases one's aesthetic 
judgment on the qualities it exhibits as natural. Whilst the former in-
terpretation rules out considering the natural item as artefact, the latter 
interpretation demands that the object is considered under "the concept 
of nature itself or the concept of some particular kind of natural phen 
omenon" (10). 
The aesthetic responses that the naturalness of an object alone can 
ground are limited, for natural objects all have in common only the fact 
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that they are not the product of human artifice. "This leaves only such 
a possibility as marvelling at the fact that something as beautiful, at-
tractive, or remarkable as this - a rainbow or the exquisite fan-shaped 
leaf of a gingko, for example - is a product of nature." (16) To capture 
the extent and variety of our aesthetic experiences, Budd must accept 
that more than this features in our appreciation of natural items. Budd 
argues that it is features that accrue to natural items in virtue of their 
being of a certain kind. One can see blossoms not just as blossoms, with 
certain shapes and colours, but also within the context of their being 
part of the "growth" and "flourishing" of the living, developing tree: 
u ••• a manifestation and beautiful expression of the resurgence of life 
triggered by the arrival of spring." (17) Similarly, as sentient beings are 
capable of certain forms of movement, the flight of birds or the out-
standing aerial manoeuvrability of dragonflies are parts of the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature as nature. These features accrue to the natural 
item in virtue of it being that kind of natural item. 
Budd claims, therefore, that we can bring to our aesthetic experi-
ence of nature a broader understanding of natural phenomena. How-
ever, it is not necessary that we do so: judgments based on a 'thin' level 
of understanding are no less correct than those based on a 'thick' level 
of understanding. But "if you have the right kind of understanding of 
nature, you can recruit to your perceptual experience of nature relevant 
thoughts, emotions and images unavailable to those who lack that un-
derstanding." (20) By 'the right kind of understanding' Budd means 
here only the sorts of understanding that will affect the aesthetic expe-
rience of a natural item considered as natural. So recognising that a 
cloud is a thunder cloud, for example, may transform our experience if 
it is informed by an awareness of the power and tumultuous forces 
acting within the cloud. 
This stands in contrast with the aesthetic appreciation of art, where 
Budd sees the right kind of understanding as just that: the correct way 
to understand the work of art. Budd thus endorses a more demanding 
cognitivism about aesthetic judgments about art: not only can our un-
derstanding of the practices, conventions and standards of an artistic 
category affect our aesthetic experience of an artwork (parallel to the 
nature case), but there is moreover a correct understanding in the artis-
tic case that exposes the true aesthetic properties of the artwork. 
Budd's general claim is that the disanalogies between art and nature 
ground a distinctive and characteristic freedom in the appreciation of 
nature, absent in the case of art. 
Budd rests the claim on the following disanalogies: 
i) Artist's intention determines the correct category under which 
a work of art should be considered. Nature is free from design 
and not the product of social practices, hence no particular 
category can be said to reveal the natural item's true aesthetic 
properties. 
ii) The category of an art object determines what we should appre-
ciate and how we should appreciate it. For example, if some-
thing is understood as a painting, we exclude from aesthetic 
consideration what is on the reverse of the canvas. The cate-
gory (e.g. painting) will tell us what mode of appreciation is 
correct (e.g. which sense-modality) and more specific determi-
nations of that category (e.g. pointillist painting) will "pre-
scribe the appropriate manner of artistic appreciation" (l08) 
depending on the distinctive features of the category's style. 
But in the natural case, categories provide no guidance for 
what or how. In the general case, there is no prescribed sense-
modality (e.g. how to attend to the sunrise, chill breeze and 
morning chorus), or perspective (e.g. look close-up / far away; 
from above / below) or scale (e.g. take one bird or the whole 
flock; one mountain or the whole range). 
From this Budd concludes that a) there are no correct categories for the 
aesthetic appreciation of a natural item, and b) that the categories de-
ployed do not determine the way in which the object should be appreci-
ated. Hence there is a characteristic freedom about the information we 
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bring to bear, and relativity based upon our chosen mode of perception. 
II - Does Budd Challenge the Objectivity of Judgments about 
Nature? 
One way to construe Budd's position is as an attack on objectivity. 
Glenn Parsons takes this view, claiming that Budd presents epistemo-
logical worries for the possibility of objective aesthetic judgments 
about nature (Parsons 2006). 
For Parsons, the hallmark of objectivity is a notion of 'genuine 
debate' featuring 'two judgments that express conflicting attitudes to-
wards the same state of affairs' (Parsons 2006: 18). Parsons interprets 
Budd's argument against objectivity as follows: 1) an appreciator must 
have epistemologically accessible evidence to support his aesthetic 
judgments; 2) this evidence comes from 'perceptual surfaces' (what 
Budd calls 'aspects') of objects; 3) objects have many different percep-
tual surfaces (thanks to the freedom and relativity we have in appreci-
ating nature); 4) different perceptual surfaces will not all exhibit the 
same aesthetic properties. Hence if the content of a debate is in fact two 
different aspects with different aesthetic properties, then the disagree-
ment is not a genuine disagreement. However, Parsons asserts the con-
verse: there are objective judgments about nature and genuine debate 
concerning them. Hence Budd's way of 'thinking must be flawed. 
Parsons' presentation of Budd's argument is not incompatible with 
his conclusion about genuine debate and objectivity of aesthetic judg-
ments about nature. Parsons confuses two issues. Budd does claim that 
the overall aesthetic value of a natural item is 'indeterminate' and 'ill-
defined', for two reasons. One, a natural item often undergoes flourish-
ing and decline over time, with no optimal condition exposing its true 
aesthetic properties. Two, the characteristic freedom and relativity of 
the appreciation of nature ensure that aesthetic properties and appear-
ances are 'indefinite' and 'open-ended'. However, this claim about over-
all aesthetic value is not the same as claiming that disagreement over 
individual judgments always fails to be objective: his view "does not 
preclude there being certain kinds of aesthetic property the attribution 
of which to a particular natural thing or some aspect of it is 'objective-
ly' true or false, not merely true or false relative to some specific mode 
of perception." (Budd 2006: 268, my emphasis) Budd continues: "even if, 
as I hold, the idea of the aesthetic value of a gazelle is indeterminate, I 
regard its bounding movement in flight as being 'objectively' graceful; 
and a bee-eater of nearly any species in good health is, for me, 'objec-
tively' beautiful". 
Budd's phrasing is unfortunate, for it is unclear why a bee-eater 
beautiful for Budd should constitute objective beauty. But that apart, 
bearing in mind that judgments can be directed at some aspect of the 
natural item, then from all perspectives and modes that present an as-
pect which is the-bounding-of-a-gazelle, those aspects have the property 
of being graceful. Budd's position thus admits of the meaningful debate 
that Parsons demands. Even though we may discuss different aspects, 
we nonetheless discuss the very same property of gracefulness which is 
exhibited by bounding-gazelle aspects. 
III - Normativity in Art and the Role of Artist's Intentions 
Budd's view of normativity in art requires the deployment of cor-
rect categories, which are those intended by the artist. However, Budd 
does not argue for this view and it is not shared by all philosophers. 
This section explains why intention is deemed necessary for grounding 
correctness. It then argues that a more satisfactory account can be 
given without recourse to intention, one which permits an additional 
class of aesthetic judgments that we would also intuitively take to af-
ford standards of correctness. 
The general account Budd follows is due to Kendall Walton 
(Walton 1970). Walton's thesis has two parts. First, he makes the psy-
chological claim that the art-historical category under which we see an 
object (or, as Budd puts it, 'the description under which'), affects our 
experience of the aesthetic properties of that object. Every category 
has what Walton calls standard, variable and contra-standard properties. 
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A feature is standard for a category "just in case it is among those in 
virtue of which works in that category belong to that category". 
(Walton 1970: 339) Not to have that property would disqualify the work 
from belonging to that quality (for example, pointed arches are stan-
dard for Gothic architecture)' Variable features are those which have 
nothing to do with an artwork's belonging to a category. Contra-
standard features tend to disqualify an artwork from belonging to a 
category. Walton maintains that standard features do not affect the 
perceived aesthetic properties of an object: e.g. it is standard for a bust 
to be represented without a torso, but this does not suggest it represents 
or resembles a torso-less person. Contra-standard features are perceived 
as doing 'violence' to a category: we find these shocking or disconcert-
ing. Variable properties tend to be the 'expressive aesthetically active' 
properties (348). 
Two categories which differ in their standard and variable proper-
ties will differ in the aesthetic significance they bestow on an artwork. 
To demonstrate this point, consider the following artificial example. An 
alien civilisation develops an art-category called guemica. These 
guemicas are made by taking a copy of Picasso's Guemica and rendering 
it in a kind of bas-relief. The standard properties of guemicas so con-
structed include the colours on the canvas, whilst the variable proper-
ties include the contours of the canvas surface. Picasso's Guemica, 
viewed as an example of this alien category of guemica, would seem by 
its flatness to be lifeless, dull, or perhaps calm. Certainly it would not 
seem dynamic and disturbing, as it does when considered under the 
aesthetic category of cubist painting, where the paintwork is a variable 
category and the flatness of the canvas is standard. Seeing an artwork 
under different categories can thus affect our aesthetic experience. 
Walton's second claim is that there is a correct category under 
which to see the artwork. Walton considers this important to "allow 
aesthetic judgments to be mistaken often enough" (355). Whilst Budd 
grounds this in the artist's intention, Walton has a broader set of crite-
ria (357-8): 
i) The artwork must have a relatively large number of features 
standard with respect to that category. 
ii) "The correct way of perceiving a work is likely to be the way 
in which it comes off best." The correct category will tend to 
draw out the greatest aesthetic interest from the work. 
iii) The artist intended the artwork to be perceived in that cate-
gory. 
iv) The category is well established in and recognised by the soci-
ety in which the artwork was produced. ('Recognised', roughly, 
when the "category figures importantly in their way of classi-
fying works of art"). 
Walton sees "no way of avoiding the conclusion" that (iii) and (iv) will 
be relevant for determining the correct category of an artwork. He 
claims that taking just CD and (ii) alone would permit the invention of 
gerrymandered categories, which have a set of standard, variable and 
contra-standard features selected precisely to turn all negative aesthetic 
traits of an artwork into positive ones (359-360). Such categories turn 
any tenth-rate work of art into a masterpiece: a conclusion we must 
reject. Hence for Walton a historical condition like (iii) or (iv) must 
playa role. 
Before considering this argument, let us turn to a rival account 
which downgrades the importance of intention. Stephen Davies main-
tains that artist's intentions are subservient to the conventions of the 
style in which she is working. "Spectators do not intuit artist's inten-
tions, they read those intentions from artist's uses of artistic conven-
tions ... We might concern ourselves not with what the artist meant by 
his artwork but rather with the meanings that might be put on the 
artwork (with regard to its historical context but, perhaps, without 
regard to its intended significance)." (Davies 1991: 194-5) This echoes 
comments made by Beardsley: as we do interpret works of art without 
knowledge of artists' intentions, artists' intentions can not be the pri-
mary means of determining artistic meaning. Davies' view suggests 
that artistic conventions reveal intentions in the artistic case just as 
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linguistic conventions reveal intentions in the linguistic case: aesthetic 
focus is then on what interpretations this particular use of artistic con-
ventions can sustain. 
Someone who adopts Davies' view can argue, contra Walton, that 
criteria (iii) and (iv) are not always relevant. The artist produces art 
within a social, theory-driven institution and acts as observer on his 
own work with awareness of conventional stylistic constraints: this 
reveals to him the ways in which his work might be received. Thus the 
artist is in a position to be mistaken about those conventions, and thus 
mistaken about the category in which his artwork fits: if he fails to 
manifest the standard features of a style, his work may be judged of 
another style. (Henri Rousseau's artworks are categorised under the 
post-impressionist primitive or naive style, but it is debatable whether 
he intended his artwork to be so considered.) Hence it can be argued 
that the artist's intention is not essential to the discernment of category. 
As for criterion (iv), Walton admits that the category being well-
established in an artistic community is not adequate to ground the no-
tion of correctness. Walton discusses Schoenberg's first 12-tone com-
positions (361). As these were discontinuous with previous tradition, 
the category of dodecaphony was not operative at the time Schoenberg 
created these works. Walton's criterion (iv) is thus not adequate for an 
account of their correct categorisation. Walton maintains, however, 
that "in almost all cases at least one of the historical conditions, (iii) and 
(iv), is of crucial importance" (361). However, this claim is not de-
fended and I believe it is false. 
To see why, consider Walton's gerrymandered-category argument 
against the sufficiency of CD and (ii). There are two responses. Davies 
argues that Walton confuses what it is to be an excellent example oj a 
style with what it is to be a masterpiece. Building a style around the 
particular properties an artwork has may suffice to turn the artwork 
into an exemplar oj that category, but it does not entail anything about 
our evaluation of that artwork. "Many exemplary members of the cate-
gory 'classical symphony' are mediocre in their artistic value, whereas 
Mozart's Prague Symphony, which is a poor instance of a symphony in 
containing only three movements, is an artistic masterpiece for all 
that." (201) Hence, it is not clear that our freedom to create styles also 
enables us to turn any artwork into a masterpiece. 
Second, even if Davies' argument fails, the nature of art criticism as 
a social enterprise provides resistance to idiosyncratic categorisations. 
Someone may turn an artwork into a masterpiece with his gerryman-
dered category, but this category will not only be difficult to construct 
(as Walton notes), but difficult to communicate. If it is difficult to com-
municate, a shared understanding will be unlikely to evolve. Without 
a shared understanding, standards of correctness for its application and 
use will be lacking. Hence it will fail to gain traction in the art commu-
nity as a serious category of art. 
But just because it is difficult for idiosyncratic categories to gain a 
hold over artistic society, that does not mean artistic society is opposed 
to them. In fact, there may be cases where such a category is imposed 
on an artwork and does get taken up by the art community. For exam-
ple, a group of artists mentally take an existing artwork out of its ac-
cepted category by focusing attention on only some variable features of 
the artwork that they find interesting. They then communicate this not 
by description but by creating new artworks that emphasise these vari-
able aspects as standard aspects: i.e. they generate a new style out of 
variable features of the old artwork. If the original artwork appears 
favourably in this new style, the new style is correctly applied to the 
existing artwork. Walton would maintain that correctness in this case 
is picked up 'by default' by criterion (iv), such that the original cate-
gory is correct, but without argument this is not obvious. 
Even if Walton were defended on all the above points, I still think 
there are other examples in which we do impose onto an artwork other 
categories not intended by an artist: cases which are context and inter-
est relative. A Cezanne painting is usually best considered as impres-
sionist. However, imagine an exhibition of only Cezanne's works, 
arranged chronologically with accompanying descriptions of his per-
sonal life around the time of each painting. Given this information, we 
might see the paintings not as impressionist but as paintings by Cezanne. 
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If so, this might affect the aesthetic properties of the artworks: we 
might see the violent brush strokes as expressive of the tenacity he 
showed in overcoming the repressive attitudes of his father and his own 
self-doubt in his abilities as an artist. 
Moreover, I think we would be correct to do so because the context 
invites this way of viewing the artwork: the contrast class offered is 
Cezanne's works, not a collection of impressionist works in general. 
The painting expresses tenacity in this context because the apprecia-
tion is interest-relative, relative to interest in the life of Cezanne: we are 
invited to bring this knowledge to the artworks, not knowledge of im-
pressionism. Thus we can use criterion (ii) to claim that, given this 
information and contrast class, we are perfectly correct to see tenacity 
in the artwork - the situation merits it aesthetically. (That is not to 
say it is automatically wrong for someone to consider the painting as 
impressionist for he might have a photographic memory of a variety of 
impressionist oeuvres - but this is to invite a new context. In the bio-
graphical context, the qualities exposed are qualities informed by 
Cezanne's biography.) Hence Walton's worries are ill-founded, for we 
sometimes ought employ criteria CD and (ii) alone with respect to con-
text and interest. 
I conclude that it is both possible to justify the correct attribution 
of aesthetic qualities to artworks without reference to artist intention 
and that there are standard cases in which we do so. Hence there is 
some freedom of aesthetic appreciation in artistic contexts, contrary to 
Budd's claims. 
IV - Allen Carlson: Scientific Cognitivism 
On the above view, an art object's aesthetic significance is given 
through a shared system of conventions which can support various 
interpretations. Perhaps normativity in the aesthetic appreciation of 
natural items can be established through parallel considerations: whilst 
the natural world is not a product of contrivance, we nonetheless im-
pose a system upon natural phenomena which contains natural 
categories and laws. Natural science thus forms a body of inter-
subjective knowledge roughly analogous to art-historical information. 
Allen Carlson proposes an argument that natural science must fulfil 
a parallel function for nature as art historical information does for art. 
First, he takes it to be the case that some aesthetic judgments about 
nature are 'appropriate, correct or perhaps simply true'. He then pro-
poses that there is no significant difference between art and nature in 
terms of normativity of aesthetic judgment. Hence, having dismissed 
other weaker models, he concludes the only plausible contender for the 
cognitivist background is natural science. 
Carlson contrasts his scientific cognitivist position with what he 
terms relativist positions. (Carlson 2000: 54) However, as was shown in 
the discussion of Budd, a 'relativist' position need not entail a challenge 
to the objectivity of aesthetic judgments - truth may need to be 
judged relative to a particular perceptual standpoint, but the properties 
appreciated in the natural item's perceptual surface may be common to 
different perceivers. Hence Carlson's opponent is not clearly defined. In 
fact, Carlson and Budd seem to agree on how to characterise the correct-
ness of aesthetic judgment: Budd's insistence that the natural should be 
seen as natural echoes Carlson's insistence that we 'follow the lead of the 
object' (06), seeing the object for what it is (i.e. as a natural thing and 
not some other thing) and appreciating it for the natural properties that 
it has. But whereas Carlson develops a thoroughgoing cognitivism to 
ground the correctness of aesthetic judgment, parallel to the artistic 
case, Budd's cognitivism is more minimalist. 
What can be said for a more thoroughgoing cognitivism? As 
Carlson notes, it must be the case that we do impose structure onto our 
natural environment: we do not find ourselves in a "blooming, buzzing 
confusion" (49). He maintains we do this through our scientific/com-
mon-sense knowledge of the world. The question is then how this 
knowledge informs our aesthetic judgments. Carlson gives certain 
straightforward cases: one cannot consider a cat as a corn field, for ex-
ample, because cats do not share many perceptual features in common 
with corn fields (i.e. following Walton's criterion (D). But Carlson 
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notes there are cases where perceptual features are not sufficient to 
determine the correct categorisation. An example is whether one takes 
an anemone to be a plant or an animal. The beautiful and mysterious 
item, considered under the category flower, becomes quite disturbing 
under the category animal: its petals become tendrils and the blos-
som's heart becomes a gaping maw. Carlson claims that the correctness 
of the assertion that the object is an animal should underwrite a parallel 
correctness in the aesthetic appreciation of it as an animal. Hence, more 
generally: 'if our appreciation is to be at a deeper level, if we are to make 
aesthetic judgments that are likely to be true and to be able to deter-
mine whether or not they are true; then we must know something about 
that which we appreciate." (68) 
Let us consider several objections Budd raises for Carlson's posi-
tion. First, Budd claims that Carlson's theory fails to explain which 
things we know will be relevant to the aesthetic appraisal of a natural 
item. Knowing the formation conditions for a rainbow, whilst not 
knowing the formation conditions for supernumerary bows, for exam-
ple, does not impose a substantial difference between appreciation of 
the former compared to the latter (Budd 2001: 22). But this objection is 
not compelling, for it is equally unclear what grounds relevant back-
ground knowledge in art: knowing art-historical facts such as the birth 
place of an artist mayor may not significantly inform my aesthetic 
appreciation of a painting. 
However, disanalogies between art and nature will clearly ground 
some differences. First, the natural category, as Budd claims, does not 
generally determine the frame of the natural object nor the mode of 
perception appropriate to it: there seems no reason to claim that the 
anemone is correctly appreciated alone, as part of a group, within the 
context of its environment, in its youth, in its later days, from up close 
or far away. It is hard to see how Carlson could successfully claim that 
deeper knowledge about anemones could ground anyone of these situa-
tions as unveiling the natural items true aesthetic properties. Art-
historical categories, on the other hand, are distinctly perceptual 
categories: it is partially their purpose to guide aesthetic appraisal. 
Nature, meanwhile, remains indifferent to our aesthetic approaches and 
the categories of nature are not discovered by scientists with aesthetic 
appraisal in mind. 
Secondly, Budd demonstrates that a natural item can sometimes be 
considered under both a more specific category and a less specific cate-
gory, and that the aesthetic judgments of a natural item under the nar-
rower category may well be contrary to judgments under the broader. 
This is also true in art. But in nature, unlike in art, Budd claims there 
is never reason to favour the narrower over the broader. Take a Clydes-
dale horse. Considered under the category horse, the Clydesdale is big 
(and thus grand or majestic). However, the Clydesdale considered 
under the category Clydesdale may well be rather small for its breed, 
and anything but majestic. In art, by contrast, Budd thinks the correct 
category is picked out by the artist's intention. 
I argued in part III that there are some correct (interest-relative) 
category ascriptions applied irrespective of artist's intention. An analo-
gous argument can be made in the case of nature, drawing upon Wal-
ton's criterion (ij) (as in the Cezanne case) in certain interest-relative 
contexts to generate what we can term correct ascriptions of categories. 
The analogy to the Cezanne case is as follows. If a Clydesdale and a 
Shetland are presented for aesthetic appreciation together, we ought to 
apply the category horse to the Clydesdale, for here is an opportunity to 
appreciate the substantial differences that exist between horse breeds. 
If, however, we attend a parade of Clydesdales at a working horse farm, 
complete with information about the distinctive features of Clydesdales 
that make them appropriate for being working horses, we ought apply 
the category Clydesdale to the parading horses, for here our attention is 
drawn to the subtle differences (in coat, mannerism and appearance) of 
the Clydesdale breed. The normative element is evidenced as follows: 
we would feel that the person who attended the parade and remarked 
only in general terms about how beautiful horses are, was missing out 
on a good opportunity to appreciate Clydesdales as Clydesdales. The 
context provides an excellent contrast class for that category, less so for 
horses in general (at least, insofar as aesthetic experience is concerned). 
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Whilst Carlson's cognitivism is too demanding overall, scientific 
knowledge is crucial in these cases. Someone with a sophisticated un-
derstanding of natural science will be in a stronger position to make 
interest-relative judgments, for only she will possess the background 
knowledge to understand what is aesthetically most interesting about 
particular contexts: this is so because natural categories are discovered 
by science (along with their standard, contra-standard and variable 
features) and in many cases employing a different category will have 
an effect on our aesthetic experience. Certain contexts will thus reward 
certain categories better than others. Only a scientifically-aware ob-
server will be able to exploit this fact. Furthermore, as Walton's crite-
rion (ii) suggests, exploiting the aesthetic potential of an object is 
important to our understanding of aesthetic normativity. Hence the 
normativity of interest-relative aesthetic judgments is a feature of both 
the appreciation of art and nature, and presupposes a greater role for 
scientific understanding in the latter than Budd admits. 
Conclusion 
Interest-relative considerations generate normativity in the natural 
case as well as in the artistic case. Carlson fails to appreciate that cer-
tain disanalogies between art and nature do affect the normativity gov-
erning the aesthetic appreciation of both. Budd, however, makes too 
much of the disanalogy regarding intention and exaggerates what he 
perceives to be the characteristic freedom in the aesthetic appreciation 
of nature. Hence whilst normativity is less clearly grounded in the 
natural case than in the artistic case, there are situations where norma-
tive similarities exist. 
Bibliography 
Budd, Malcolm (2002) The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford) 
(2006) 'Objectivity and the Aesthetic Value of Nature: Reply to 
---
Parsons', British Journal of Aesthetics 46: 3, 267-73 
Carlson, Allen (2000) Aesthetics and the Environment (London and New York: 
Routledge) 
Davies, Stephen (1991) Definitions of Art (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press) 
Parsons, Glenn (2006) 'Freedom and Objectivity in the Aesthetic Appreciation 
of Nature', British Journal of Aesthetics 46: I, 17-37 
Walton, Kendall (1970) 'Categories of Art', Philosophical Review 79: 3, 334-67 
